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Human Capital Accumulation and Labour Market Equilibrium
*
 
We analyse an equilibrium labour market with on-the-job search and experience effects 
(where workers learn-by-doing). The analysis yields a standard Mincer wage equation with 
worker fixed effects and endogenously determined firm fixed effects. It shows that learning-
by-doing increases equilibrium wage dispersion consistent with the data. Equilibrium sorting - 
where over time more experienced workers also tend to find and quit to better paid 
employment - has a significant impact on wage inequality. As the model yields a cross 
section distribution of wages paid with the ‘right’ structure (the density of wages paid is single 
peaked with a ‘fat’ Pareto right tail) and yields the ‘right’ time profile of worker wage outcomes 
(the initial 10 years of a worker’s career are characterised by several job changes and rapid 
wage growth) it yields a new, coherent statistical structure for future applied work. 
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Modern labour markets are characterised by a signiﬁcant amount of churning. Workers
change status frequently, wages vary through time, and jobs are continually being created
and destroyed. To illustrate, in the US approximately 30 percent of workers change jobs
each year, whereas something like 10 percent of all jobs are destroyed in a year (and
10 percent are usually created). Further the average real wage of high school graduates
increases by about 50 percent in the ﬁrst ten years of their working life. After those ﬁrst
ten years, however, further wage gains are much more moderate (Rubinstein and Weiss,
2007). Explaining such variation has long been a central issue in labour economics.
Surprisingly, however, little work has been done in constructing a coherent theoretical
framework in which to study this variation. Indeed without such a framework it seems
diﬃcult to have a consistent statistical description of market behaviour. This paper
provides a useful and tractable framework to study such labour market outcomes. We
do this by integrating two central pillars of modern labour economics: (i) the theory
of human capital accumulation and (ii) equilibrium turnover in labour markets where
workers search for better paid employment. As we shall see, the marriage of these two
areas leads to new insights on how wages change over time, how wages of diﬀerent workers
diﬀer at a moment in time and the interrelationship between job turnover and changes in
wages.
Since the pioneering work of Becker (1975) and Mincer (1974), human capital theory
has been used to explain the wage growth of workers over the life cycle. According to this
theory, wages increase as workers accumulate ﬁrm speciﬁc and general skills. Workers
who change job, or those who are laid oﬀ, lose their ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital but keep
their general human capital. The assumed competitive environment, however, implies
this approach has little to say about either why or when a worker changes job. This
seems somewhat unfortunate as a signiﬁcant percentage of observed wage increases occur
precisely when the worker changes job (see Topel and Ward, 1992). Further, this approach
has diﬃculty in explaining why workers with seemingly identical characteristics are paid
diﬀerently (see Mortensen, 2003).
This paper considers the impact of human capital accumulation on equilibrium market
outcomes in a non-competitive labour market with search frictions. The approach is
motivated in large part by the following empirical fact. It is well known from the Mincer
literature that, on average across all workers, log wages are an increasing concave function
of experience. There is, however, enormous variation in individual wage outcomes. Table
1 below is a simple modiﬁcation of results recently described in Rubinstein and Weiss
(2007) using the Current Population Surveys (CPS). Workers were asked whether, over
the previous year, they had had a rise, no change, or decline in their nominal wage.
Those that reported a wage gain are termed Gainers, those who reported a wage decline
are termed Losers, the others reported no change in nominal wage. The average real
2average wage change was then calculated for each group.
Table 1: Annual Growth Rates of Real Wages of College
Graduates: CPS-ORG 1998-2002
Experience Percentage Wage Growth












Table 1 implies that of workers with 0-10 years experience and in any one year, 64%
enjoyed a wage gain and Gainers on average enjoyed a 26% increase in wage. 30% instead
suﬀered a wage loss and Losers on average suﬀered a loss of 35%. The rest had no change.
Across experience groups, these wage changes are surprisingly large: the average real wage
growth of Gainers is over 25%, whereas the average loss among Losers is even larger, above
34%. Conditional on being a Gainer or Loser, however, Table 1 shows that the eﬀect of
experience on the expected wage change is small. Instead the main eﬀect of experience
is that as workers become more experienced, they are less likely to be Gainers and more
likely to be Losers. Thus it is the change in these probabilities which causes average wage
gains to decline with experience. The challenge is to explain why.
A search approach provides an elegant explanation. When jobs are not for life, unem-
ployed workers are willing to take low paid employment as they can continue to search
for better paid work while employed. Indeed when experience is valuable, as is the case
in this paper, (young) inexperienced unemployed workers are willing to accept very low
starting wages in order to gain work experience. When frictions are not too large, how-
ever, the early years of a worker’s career are then characterised by rapid wage growth as
each poorly paid worker eventually ﬁnds and quits to better paid employment. Of course
such early wage growth is relatively short-lived as each worker eventually exhausts the
possibility of ﬁnding ever-better paid employment. This approach thus explains why, on
average, wages increase over time but at a decreasing rate, and why those wage gains are
3directly related to the probability of ﬁnding and quitting to better paid employment.1
Of course learning-by-doing remains an important factor in the determination of wages.
Typists become better typists while working as typists, economists become more produc-
tive by doing economics, etc. This seems both an important and intuitive idea. The
issue, however, is to identify what portion of wage increases arise through productivity
increases (through learning-by-doing) and what portion is due to job search, where over
time workers simply ﬁnd and quit to better paid employment. The diﬃculty is doing this
within an equilibrium framework where all behave optimally and wages are endogenously
determined.
This paper extends the Burdett and Mortensen (1998) framework, henceforth B/M,
to assess the impact of learning-by-doing on equilibrium market outcomes. A most useful
feature of our approach is that individual worker wages remain consistent with a standard
Mincer equation. Furthermore the ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are endogenously determined and quit
turnover is an equilibrium outcome. The model not only explains why quit rates decline
with age, it is also consistent with the fact that quit turnover is a major source of early
wage gains for young workers. By detailing how wages are disperse (and thus unequal)
across all employed workers, this framework also provides a direct link between studies of
wage determination and studies of wage inequality.
Indeed this paper yields a remarkably insightful decomposition of the variance of log
wages across employed workers. Consistent with Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999),
the theory implies that worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are not correlated with each other
- there is no sorting by types. Nevertheless equilibrium sorting, where over time workers
become more experienced and tend to ﬁnd better paid employment, has a signiﬁcant
impact on overall wage inequality. In essence young workers face a double whammy: they
not only have little experience but most job oﬀers typically pay low wages (the equilibrium
distribution of pay oﬀers is skewed to the bottom end of the distribution). Over time
(young) workers become better paid not only because they become more experienced,
and thus more productive, they also eventually ﬁnd and quit to better paid employment.
The positive correlation between these two processes magniﬁes measured wage inequality:
the young typically earn much less than the old.
Hornstein et. al. (2007) demonstrates that when search frictions are calibrated to
turnover data, the B/M framework generates too little wage dispersion. Learning-by-
doing, however, reduces unemployed worker reservation wages - unemployed workers are
willing to accept low wages as work experience is valuable. Learning-by-doing, however,
also increases wage competition across ﬁrms for experienced workers. Indeed ﬁrms which
pay higher wages attract and retain a more experienced, and thus more productive, work-
1Our model also explains why the probability of being a loser increases with experience. With job
destruction shocks, a well paid (experienced) worker is likely to be next employed on a signiﬁcantly lower
wage. A poorly paid (inexperienced) worker however, when laid-oﬀ, may well ﬁnd a better paid job on
re-employment and is thus less likely to be a Loser.
4force. We show that learning-by-doing increases equilibrium wage dispersion consistent
with the observations described in Hornstein et. al. (2007). Furthermore we show the
implied cross section distribution of wages paid has the right structure (the density of
wages paid is single peaked with a ‘fat’ Pareto right tail). Given this framework yields
the ‘right’ time proﬁle of worker wage outcomes - the initial 10 years of a worker’s career
are characterised by several job changes and rapid wage growth - and a Mincer wage
equation, this structure provides an important, coherent benchmark for future empirical
work.
There are a few papers which have investigated learning-by-doing eﬀects within a
similar turnover framework as studied here. Bunzel et. al. (2000) analyzed a B/M model
with human capital accumulation. Unlike our approach, they assume agents are initially
homogeneous and workers lose all their human capital when laid oﬀ. This leads to very
diﬀerent results. Rubinstein and Weiss (2007) analyse human capital accumulation and
on-the-job search but do not consider equilibrium. In an interesting application of record
statistics, Barlevy (2008) estimates the wage process identiﬁed here. Using a similar
model, Fu (2009) asks when ﬁrms will provide general human capital for its employees.
Bagger et. al. (2006) instead extend the oﬀer matching framework developed by
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a,b) to incorporate learning on-the-job with individual pro-
ductivity shocks. Their focus is on estimating the resulting wage process over a worker’s
life cycle. Our focus here is to study both individual wage dynamics and cross-section
wage dispersion in the case when ﬁrms do not respond to outside oﬀers (see Mortensen,
2003, for a full discussion). Indeed by identifying closed form solutions, our framework
yields new and clear insights on the impact of learning-by-doing and on-the-job search on
market outcomes.
The paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 describes
optimal search behaviour by workers. Section 4 formally deﬁnes an equilibrium and
describes the steady state distributions of worker experience across unemployed and em-
ployed workers. Section 5 identiﬁes the unique equilibrium and obtains its closed form
solution. Section 6 then describes the equilibrium wage outcomes and focuses on two
equilibrium eﬀects - positive sorting across employed workers on experience and pay rates
earned, and describes how learning-by-doing changes the equilibrium wage setting incen-
tives of ﬁrms. Using numerical examples, Section 7 describes the impact of on-the-job
learning on equilibrium wage outcomes. Most proofs are relegated to a technical Ap-
pendix.
2 The Model
Time is continuous with an inﬁnite horizon. Keeping things as simple as possible only
steady-states are considered. There is a continuum of both ﬁrms and workers, each
5of measure one. All ﬁrms are equally productive and have a constant return to scale
technology. There is turnover of workers: each worker permanently exits the labour
market at rate φ > 0, while φ also describes the inﬂow of new labour market entrants. This
yields an overlapping generations structure where worker ages are distributed according
to the exponential distribution. Assume there are I types of workers, where each type is
deﬁned by his/her initial productivity. In particular, let yi denote the initial productivity
of a type i labour market entrant and assume y1 < y2 < ... < yI. Let A denote the
distribution function of these initial productivities and γi denote the proportion of new
entrants who are type i. As all have the same exit rate φ, steady-state turnover implies
γi is also the number of type i workers in the market.
Learning-by-doing implies a worker’s productivity increases at rate ρ > 0 when work-
ing. Thus after x years of work experience, a type i worker’s productivity is y = yieρx.
An unemployed worker’s productivity y remains constant through time.
A worker with productivity y generates ﬂow output y while employed. We normalize
the price of the production good to one, so y also describes ﬂow revenue. Each ﬁrm pays
each of its employees the same piece rate θ. Thus given an employee with productivity
y, the worker is paid ﬂow wage w = θy. Each ﬁrm’s total proﬁt ﬂow is simply total ﬂow
output from its employees multiplied by (1 − θ). As diﬀerent ﬁrms may oﬀer diﬀerent
piece rates, let F(θ) denote the proportion of ﬁrms oﬀering a piece rate no greater than
θ. Further, let θ,θ denote the inﬁmum and supremum of the support of F. There are
job destruction shocks in that each employed worker is displaced into unemployment
according to a Poisson process with parameter δ > 0. For tractability we follow Postel-
Vinay and Robin (2002b) and assume a worker with productivity y enjoys ﬂow income by
while unemployed, where 0 < b < 1. We discuss further the role of this assumption below.
Employed and unemployed workers receive job oﬀers according to a Poisson process
with parameter λ > 0. Of course empirical work ﬁnds these arrival rates diﬀer across
employment states (e.g. Jolivet et. al., 2006). Although the extension to diﬀerent arrival
rates is straightforward (see for example B/M), it does not change the underlying insights
and makes the exposition unnecessarily cumbersome.
Search is random and so any job oﬀer θ can be considered as a random draw from
F. If a job oﬀer is rejected, the worker remains in his/her current state and there is no
recall. We make the standard tie-breaking assumptions: an unemployed worker accepts a
job oﬀer if indiﬀerent to accepting it or remaining unemployed, while an employed worker
quits only if the job oﬀer is strictly preferred. Note this structure implicitly makes two
critical restrictions. First we assume that if an employee receives an outside oﬀer, there
is no Bertrand competition for the worker’s services (Postel-Vinay and Robin, 2002a,b).
The worker instead simply accepts or rejects the oﬀer. Second we simplify by ruling out
wage/tenure contracts as considered in Burdett and Coles (2003) which would severely
complicate the analysis.
6All agents are risk neutral. For simplicity we assume a zero rate of time preference but
then require φ > ρ to ensure total expected lifetime payoﬀs are ﬁnite. Each worker thus
maximizes expected lifetime income. Each ﬁrm chooses piece rate θ to maximize steady
state ﬂow proﬁt, taking into account the search strategies of workers.
3 Worker Behavior
In this section we take the distribution of piece rate oﬀers F as given and characterize
optimal worker behavior. For notational ease we suppress reference to F in the following
functions. As workers are heterogeneous, let W U(y) denote the expected lifetime payoﬀ
of an unemployed worker with productivity y using an optimal search strategy. W E(y,θ)
denotes the expected lifetime payoﬀ of a worker with productivity y, currently employed
at piece rate θ, when using an optimal search strategy.
Consider ﬁrst an unemployed worker with productivity y. As there is no learning-
by-doing while unemployed (and no depreciation), standard arguments imply the ﬂow
Bellman equation describing W U(y) is
φW








While unemployed the worker enjoys ﬂow income by. Job oﬀers are received at rate λ
and, conditional on the realized draw θ′, the worker either accepts it and enjoys welfare
gain W E(y,θ′) − W U(y), or remains unemployed with productivity y.
Consider now an employed worker with productivity y employed at a ﬁrm paying piece
rate θ. As it is always better to be employed at a ﬁrm paying a higher piece rate, it is
immediate that W E(y,θ) is increasing in θ. Thus an employed worker quits to an outside
oﬀer θ′ if and only if θ′ > θ. Assuming for the moment that this worker never voluntarily
quits into unemployment (which is true in equilibrium), standard arguments imply the
ﬂow Bellman equation describing W E is:
(φ + δ)W












The ﬁrst term on the right hand side describes ﬂow earnings, the second describes in-
creased value through learning-by-doing, the third describes the capital gain by receiving
a preferred outside oﬀer θ′ > θ, while the last corresponds to the welfare loss through
being laid-oﬀ.
Characterising the solution to these Bellman equations is straightforward. As is stan-
dard, all unemployed workers use a reservation piece rate strategy. Proposition 1 below,
however, shows that all use the same reservation piece rate θR and identiﬁes the conditions
7which fully determine θR. As a useful shorthand, deﬁne
q(θ) = φ + δ + λ(1 − F(θ)),
which is the rate at which any employee exits a ﬁrm oﬀering piece rate θ, and note q(θ) > ρ
for all θ (as φ > ρ).
Proposition 1: Optimal job search implies:
(i) all unemployed workers have the same reservation piece rate θR; i.e. an unemployed
worker y accepts job oﬀer θ if and only if θ ≥ θR, where
(ii) the reservation piece rate θR is jointly determined by the following pair of equations
for (θR,αU) :
ρα
U = b − θ
R (3)
φα






Further for any F a solution exists, is unique, implies θR < b and θR is strictly decreasing
in ρ.
The proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix. Here we present the main arguments.






where αU, αE(.) are determined by the above Bellman equations. The proof of Proposition
1 essentially solves for αU, αE(.) and θR, noting that the reservation piece rate θR solves
αU = αE(θR). As this latter condition is independent of y, it follows that all unemployed
workers utilize the same reservation piece rate.2
With no learning-by-doing, (3) implies θR = b: when experience has no value, unem-
ployed workers reject all oﬀers below b. But with learning-by-doing, ρ > 0, experience is
valuable as it increases future productivity. Unemployed workers then have a reservation
piece rate below b. Indeed for a given oﬀer distribution F, Proposition 1 shows a higher
rate of learning-by-doing implies a strictly lower reservation piece rate of unemployed
workers. θR may even become negative: workers may be willing to purchase work experi-
ence. As in Rosen (1972), this change in reservation wages of unemployed workers aﬀects
the wage posting incentives of ﬁrms. The next step is to characterise equilibrium wage
competition and so determine equilibrium F.
2This very useful property disappears if instead we assume unemployment beneﬁts are proportional
to the previous wage; say unemployed workers receive beneﬁt bθ0y where θ0 denotes the piece rate paid
by previous employer and b < 1 is the replacement rate. As such payments are proportional to y, the
value functions W E and W U remain linear in y. But the optimal reservation piece rate θR now varies
depending on θ0. Although describing optimal worker behavior remains straightforward, the additional
recursive element yields a much more complicated equilibrium structure. We leave this problem for future
research.
84 Proﬁts and Steady-States
Notice ﬁrst that oﬀering a piece rate θ < θR implies the ﬁrm makes zero proﬁt (the
ﬁrm attracts no workers). As oﬀering θ = b generates strictly positive proﬁt (as b <
1), this strictly dominates oﬀering θ < θR. Thus in any market equilibrium, we must
have θ ≥ θR and each unemployed worker, regardless of type, always accepts the ﬁrst
job oﬀer received. We shall show that that this implies each type i will not only have
(a) the same unemployment rate U in a Market Equilibrium, but also (b) the same
distribution of experiences across unemployed workers, denoted N(x), and (c) the same
joint distribution of experience and piece rates across employed workers, which we denote
H(x,θ). Proposition 2 below fully characterises these distribution functions.
As there is no discounting, the arguments in Burdett and Coles (2003) imply steady
state ﬂow proﬁt equals the hiring rate of the ﬁrm, multiplied by the expected proﬁt of


















τ=0 e−q(θ)τ(1 − θ)yieρ(x+τ)dτ]dH(x,θ′)
#
.
Recall γi is the number of workers in the economy who are type i, and thus γiU is the
number of type i workers who are unemployed. For each i, the ﬁrst term in the above
equation is the steady state ﬂow proﬁt due to attracting type i unemployed workers whose
experience x is drawn from N(x). For each such hire, learning-by-doing implies the new
hire has productivity y = yieρ(x+τ) at each tenure τ ≥ 0. As the worker leaves employment
at rate q(θ), the integrand thus describes expected total proﬁt per hire. The second term
is the ﬂow proﬁt due to attracting type i employed workers who are on lower piece rates
θ′ < θ; λγi(1−U)dH(x,θ′) describes the hiring inﬂow of each such worker and the inside






















i γiyi is the mean ability of labour market entrants. We now formally deﬁne
an equilibrium.
A Market Equilibrium is a set {θR,U,N(.),H(.),F(.)} such that
(i) θR is the optimal reservation piece rate of any unemployed worker;
(ii) U,N(.),H(.) are consistent with steady state turnover given piece rate oﬀers F(.) and
optimal worker search strategies;
9(iii) the constant proﬁt condition is satisﬁed; i.e.,
π(θ) = π > 0 for all θ where dF(θ) > 0;
π(θ) ≤ π for all θ where dF(θ) = 0.
The constant proﬁt condition requires that all equilibrium oﬀers, those with dF(θ) > 0,
enjoy the same proﬁt π, while all other oﬀers make no greater proﬁt. Lemma 1 presents
a useful preliminary result. As the proof is well known, it is relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1: A Market Equilibrium implies (i) F(.) contains no mass points; (ii) F(.) has
a connected support and (iii) θ = θR.
The aim now is to construct equilibrium π(θ). To do this we need to solve for U and
the distribution functions N and H. We consider each of these objects in turn.
First consider steady state turnover in the pool of type i unemployed workers, where
γiU is the number of type i unemployed workers. As each unemployed worker accepts the
ﬁrst job oﬀer received (because all ﬁrms oﬀer θ ≥ θR), the total outﬂow from this pool is
(λ+φ)γiU. As steady state requires this equals the total inﬂow, which is φγi+δγi(1−U),
then the equilibrium unemployment rate is
U =
φ + δ
φ + δ + λ
,
which is the same for all types.
Next consider the pool of type i unemployed workers with experience no greater than
x ≥ 0. Steady-state turnover requires
γiφ + δγi[1 − U]H(x,θ) = [φ + λ]γiUN(x),
where the left hand side describes the inﬂow (new labour market entrants with zero
experience) and laid-oﬀ employed workers with experience less than x, and the right hand
side describes the outﬂow. Solving for N(x), using the above solution for U, yields
N(x) =
φ(φ + δ + λ) + λδH(x,θ)
(φ + λ)(φ + δ)
for all x ≥ 0. (6)
Finally consider the pool of type i employed workers who have productivity no greater
than x and earn piece rate no greater than θ. For θ ≥ θ and x ≥ 0, the total outﬂow of
workers from this pool, over any instant of time dt > 0, is
γi(1 − U)H(x,θ)q(θ)dt + γi(1 − U)[H(x,θ) − H(x − dt,θ)] + O(dt
2).
The ﬁrst term is the outﬂow of workers in this pool who either leave employment, or quit
to a job with θ′ > θ. The second is the outﬂow of those who accumulate experience greater
10than x, while the last term corrects for the fact that some do both but this term has the
property O(dt2)/dt → 0 as dt → 0. The inﬂow into this pool is simply γiUN(x)λF(θ)dt:
those type i unemployed workers with experience no greater than x who ﬁnd a job no
better than θ. Setting inﬂow equal to outﬂow, rearranging appropriately and then letting




= (φ + δ)F(θ)N(x). (7)
By solving this partial diﬀerential equation, Proposition 2 now obtains closed form solu-
tions for N and H. Its proof is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 2: A Market Equilibrium implies distribution functions
N(x) = 1 −
λδ






















for all θ ∈ [θ,θ] and x ≥ 0.
This explicit characterisation of the joint cdf H(.) is a major contribution of the paper.
By detailing how experience and pay is distributed across employed workers, it provides
a precise understanding of wage inequality in labour markets. We discuss the resulting
insights in much greater detail below. Before doing that, however, we ﬁrst complete the
characterisation of a Market Equilibrium.
5 Market Equilibrium
Although algebraically tedious, solving for the Market Equilibrium is remarkably simple.
By Lemma 1 (connected support), all we need do is solve the constant proﬁt condition,





















We already know U = (φ + δ)/(φ + δ + λ) while Proposition 2 describes the distribution





φ(φ + δ + λ)
(φ + δ)
￿
(φ + δ − ρ)















(φ + δ + λ)(φ + δ − ρ)
φ(φ + δ + λ) − ρ(φ + λ)
￿
.
11Now substitute these expressions into (10). Further simpliﬁcation ﬁnds the constant proﬁt






[φ − ρ + δ + λ(1 − F(θ))]
2 = π. (11)
Somewhat miraculously, this yields a quadratic equation for equilibrium F = F(θ). As F
must be increasing over θ, (11) implies the following closed form solution for F.
Proposition 3: A Market Equilibrium implies
F(θ) =




yφ(φ + δ − ρ)[φ + δ − ρ + λ]
λπ(φ(φ + δ + λ) − ρ(φ + λ))
￿1/2
(1 − θ)






All that remains now is to determine equilibrium π. It is easier, however, to instead solve
for equilibrium θ. By Lemma 1 (no mass points), then F is zero at θ = θ and so (12)
implies π and θ are related as




yφ(φ + δ − ρ)[φ + δ − ρ + λ]




Use this condition to substitute out π in (12). The equilibrium oﬀer distribution can then
be written as
F = b F(θ | θ) =
￿













The ﬁnal step is to determine equilibrium θ. Suppose θ < b is an equilibrium value, and
(13) then implies F = b F(θ | θ) is the equilibrium oﬀer distribution. Given F = b F(θ | θ),
the conditions of Proposition 1 determine θR, which we denote θR = b θR(θ). Lemma 1(iii)
further requires θR = θ in a Market Equilibrium. Thus a Market Equilibrium requires
solving the ﬁxed point condition b θR(θ) = θ. This condition also has a closed form solution.
Theorem 1. For any ρ < φ a Market Equilibrium exists, is unique and implies
θ = θ
R = b − ρ
(φ + δ − ρ + λ)
2 b + λ2(1 − b)
φ(φ + δ − ρ + λ)
2 − ρλ2 . (14)
Equilibrium F is given by (13) with θ given by (14), and the steady state distribution
functions N,H are as described in Proposition 2.
Proof: In the Appendix we show that solving b θR(θ) = θ yields the unique solution
(14) for θ. Given the equilibrium distribution F as described in Theorem 1 then, by
construction, the unemployed worker’s optimal reservation piece rate θR = θ. Further
U,N, and H are consistent with steady state turnover while F ensures the constant proﬁt
condition holds for all θ ∈ [θ,θ]. All that remains is to show there is no other oﬀer which
12is proﬁt increasing. Oﬀering θ < θ yields zero proﬁt as all workers reject such oﬀers (as
θR = θ). Conversely oﬀering θ > θ yields strictly less proﬁt than oﬀering θ = θ as it
attracts no additional workers and yields strictly less proﬁt per hire. Thus the above
identiﬁes the Market Equilibrium. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
6 Equilibrium wage outcomes
The above model yields the following Mincer wage equation: the wage earned by a type
i worker employed at ﬁrm j at date t with experience xit satisﬁes:
logwijt = logyi + logθj + ρxit,
where θj is the piece rate oﬀered by ﬁrm j. Hence each worker’s wage wijt is composed of
a worker ﬁxed eﬀect (initial ability yi), a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect (the ﬁrm’s piece rate θj) and
experience. Wages are disperse because of cohort eﬀects (some workers have been in the
labour market for 40 years and have accumulated lots of experience) and within-cohort
eﬀects where individual labour market histories evolve stochastically (some may be lucky
and quickly ﬁnd highly paid employment, others might get stuck in low paid employment
or be laid-oﬀ). The analysis yields two important pieces of information. First it describes
H(x,θ), the joint distribution of experience and piece rates across all employed workers in
the labour market. Thus we obtain a detailed description of equilibrium wage dispersion
across employed workers. The analysis also determines endogenously the distribution of
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, F. We can thus consider how changes in the rate of on-the-job learning
ρ aﬀects these ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects, where θj ∼ F.
Below we use numerical examples to understand qualitatively the impact of these
eﬀects on market wage outcomes. Here we detail each of these eﬀects in turn.
6.1 Equilibrium Sorting
First note consistent with the ﬁndings of Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) and
Abowd, Finer and Kramarz (1999), that there is no sorting by underlying types - the
worker and ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects are orthogonal (see Mortensen, 2003, for further discussion).
Also as in Altonji and Shakotko, 1987, and Topel, 1991, there is no relationship between
experience and worker type. A fundamental insight, however, is there is (strong) positive
sorting between experience and piece rates earned.
For example consider a worker with experience x. Using (9) it can be shown that the
13conditional distribution of piece rates enjoyed by such workers is3
H(θ | x) = F
"




δ + (φ + λ)(1 − F)
#
.
Putting x = 0 ﬁnds H(θ | 0) = F; the ﬁrst job of new entrants is a random draw from
F. But it is immediate that H(θ | x) is strictly decreasing in x; i.e. more experienced
workers typically enjoy higher piece rates (ﬁrst order stochastic dominance). This occurs
as workers not only accumulate experience while employed but also continue search for
better paid employment. As experience becomes large, this distribution converges to its
ergodic distribution
H(θ | ∞) =
δF
δ + (φ + λ)(1 − F)
,
which is non-degenerate. Job destruction shocks imply employed workers are occasionally
displaced from their jobs and must search anew.
Such sorting generates an important composition eﬀect - ﬁrms which oﬀer a higher
piece rate also enjoy, in a Market Equilibrium, a more experienced and thus more produc-
tive workforce. This has a direct impact on wage competition. For example, consider a
ﬁrm which oﬀers piece rate θ. Using (9) it can be shown that the conditional distribution
of experience across employed workers is:













(φ + δ)[q − φF]
e
−qx.
This expression is most easily interpreted by ﬁrst considering the ﬁrm oﬀering the
lowest piece rate θ = θ. This ﬁrm only attracts unemployed workers. The ﬁrst term
describes its distribution of worker experience through only hiring new market entrants
(with no previous experience), taking into account that such employees depart at rate q.
Given δ > 0, the second term captures the composition eﬀect by also hiring unemployed
workers who have some previous experience. The third term takes into account that a ﬁrm
oﬀering θ > θ, attracts workers from ﬁrms oﬀering θ′ < θ. The added restriction δ > φ
(which implies each worker expects to be laid oﬀ at least once over a working lifetime) is
3The easiest way to obtain this condition is to note



























and grind away using (9).
14suﬃcient (but not necessary) to establish ∂[H(x|θ)]/∂θ < 0;4 i.e. ﬁrms that pay higher
piece rates attract a more experienced, and thus more productive workforce (ﬁrst order
stochastic dominance). By further raising the value of oﬀering a higher piece rate, this
composition eﬀect directly increases wage competition between ﬁrms for employees.
The market variance of log wages can be decomposed as:
var(logw) = var(logyi) + var(logθ) + ρ
2var(x) + 2ρcov(x,logθ).
The ﬁrst term of the right-hand side describes wage variation due to ex-ante worker
heterogeneity in initial ability. The second term speciﬁes the variance due to ex-post ﬁrm
heterogeneity, where on-the-job search implies diﬀerent ﬁrms post diﬀerent piece rates.
The third is largely due to the overlapping generations structure, where older workers
typically have greater labour market experience. The last term is due to equilibrium
sorting: more experienced workers, having spent more time in the labour market, tend
to earn higher piece rates. In the numerical examples below this covariance term is
large. It suggests that a signiﬁcant fraction of observed wage variation arises as young
inexperienced workers start their careers on low wages but, over time, accumulate both
greater human capital and ﬁnd better paid employment. Of course with no on-the-job
learning, ρ = 0, this covariance term has no additional eﬀect on wage dispersion. Similarly
if there are no search frictions, the competitive outcome implies θ = 1 and this latter
covariance term is zero. Conversely this sorting mechanism with frictions implies learning-
by-doing has a potentially large impact on equilibrium wage dispersion.
6.2 Equilibrium Wage Competition
With no value to experience, ρ = 0, workers are not willing to work for a piece rate below
b (Theorem 1 implies θR = b). But using (14) in Theorem 1, some algebra establishes
the equilibrium reservation piece rate is strictly decreasing with ρ (even when F is en-
dogenously determined). As ﬁrst argued in Rosen (1972), ﬁrms might extract the rents
associated with on-the-job learning by setting relatively low wages. In the Market Equi-
librium identiﬁed here, (some) ﬁrms indeed respond by cutting wages; i.e. those ﬁrms
oﬀering the least generous piece rate θ = θR.
But market competition here is not just about extracting full rents from unemployed




2δF ′φ(φ + λ + δ)q




(φ+λ) − e−qx] −
￿
φqλ2F′F[1 − F]x2








φ2(φ + λ + δ)F[1 − F]
(φ + δ)[q − φF]
2 +
φq[1 − 2F]
(φ + δ)[q − φF]
#
The ﬁrst two terms are guaranteed to be negative. The third term is guaranteed to be negative if F < δ/φ.
Thus δ > φ is suﬃcient for ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
15workers - by oﬀering a higher wage, a ﬁrm also attracts employees from low wage ﬁrms.
On-the-job learning increases wage competition by directly increasing the value of hiring
new workers. It also increases wage competition indirectly through the composition eﬀect
identiﬁed above: a higher piece rate both attracts and retains a more experienced, and
thus more productive, workforce. Consider then the equilibrium piece rate oﬀered by the
ﬁrm at the nth decile; i.e. the ﬁrm which sets piece rate θ so that F(θ) = n. (13) implies
this piece rate is given by:
θ(n) = 1 − (1 − θ)
￿
φ + δ − ρ + λ(1 − n)
φ + δ − ρ + λ
￿2
.
An increase in ρ implies equilibrium θ decreases, which lowers θ(n). But for n > 0 and
ρ < φ, an increase in ρ decreases the squared bracketed term which increases θ(n). This
reﬂects the increased competition eﬀect described above. The overall eﬀect of learning-
by-doing on θ(n) is therefore ambiguous (and depends on n). It is not the case that all
ﬁrms set lower wages with an increase in ρ. There is, however, an increase in the range of
oﬀers θ − θ, suggesting that greater on-the-job learning increases price dispersion.
Finally we quickly consider the Mm measure of wage dispersion as deﬁned in Hornstein
et. al. (2007), which is the ratio between the mean wage paid to the minimum observed
wage (or reservation wage). Hornstein et. al. (2007) argue that, for plausible parameter
values and for the U.S. economy, the B/M model generates too little wage dispersion; that
is, worker reservation wages are too high to be consistent with the data. The introduction
of learning-by-doing, which increases equilibrium wage dispersion, corrects this feature
of the B/M framework. Indeed as clearly demonstrated in Theorem 1, a ρ < φ exists
where θR = 0 and the Mm ratio is then unboundedly large. In the following numerical
examples, we ﬁnd the value of ρ necessary to generate empirically plausible values of the
Mm ratio is entirely reasonable.
7 Simulations
We now perform some numerical simulations to illustrate the model’s implications for
wage dispersion. Using a year as the reference time unit, we set φ = 0.025 so that workers
have a 40 year expected working lifetime. Note this also implies workers discount the
future at 2.5 percent per annum. Following Jolivet et. al. (2006), who estimate turnover
parameters for the US, we set δ = 0.055 and λ = 0.15.5 Following Hall and Milgrom (2008)
we set b = 0.71. We set ρ = 0.009 which ensures that the ratio between the minimum and
the average piece rate earned by workers, the Mm ratio, is consistent with the evidence
reported in Hornstein et. al. (2007). A one percent per annum rate of learning-by-doing
5As our focus is on equilibrium wage dispersion and not equilibrium unemployment rates, we use the
oﬀer arrival rate estimate for employed workers.
16is clearly reasonable, though it is below the estimate of the marginal impact of experience
on log wages as reported by Altonji and Williams (2005) for the US.
Suppose ﬁrst A is degenerate (identical entrants) and that each labour market entrant
has initial productivity yi = 1. Market Equilibrium then implies θR = 0.35, θ = 0.93 and
a Mm ratio θM/θR = 2.27.6 Figure 1 describes the resulting equilibrium wage density
G′(w).7


















Figure 1: Wage Density when A is a Mass
Despite assuming all entrants are identical, there is signiﬁcant equilibrium wage dis-
persion. The insights are twofold. At long experiences (i.e. at high productivities),
the conditional distribution of piece rates earned converges to the ergodic distribution
H(θ | ∞). It can be formally shown that at high productivities, the density of wages
paid (asymptotically) mirrors the density of worker productivities. But the steady state
distribution of worker productivities is Pareto.8 Learning-by-doing thus implies the right
tail of the wage density function is asymptotically Pareto distributed and so has a ‘fat’
right tail. This of course is a well known property of empirical wage distributions; see for
example von Weizs¨ acker (1993) and Neal and Rosen (2000).
Conversely at short experiences, search frictions imply there is a lot of randomness in
6Although Hornstein, et. al. (2007) report an average Mm ratio of 1.7 based on all the data sets used
(PSID, 1990 Census and OES), our Mm ratio is overall consistent with their results. In particular, based
on the 1990 Census data (Table 3) and using the wage at the ﬁrst or ﬁfth decile of the wage distribution
as the lowest observed wage gives Mm ratios above 2.
7In the Appendix we provide a formal derivation of the wage density.
8This arises as the distribution of experience, H(x,θ), is exponential, while each worker’s productivity
is y = yieρx.
17initial worker employment outcomes. But note that the job search process (ﬁnding better
paid employment) is a relatively rapid process (a job oﬀer arrival rate of 15% per annum)
compared to on-the-job learning (where productivity increases at only 1% per annum).
The increasing left tail of the wage distribution resembles the B/M wage density and
arises as young workers typically start their careers in low wage jobs but quickly move to
better paid work through on-the-job search. Wage dispersion thus reﬂects the interaction
between (fast) worker on-the-job search and (slow) learning-by-doing.
Smoothing out this wage distribution clearly requires some worker heterogeneity. For
ease of exposition the theory section assumed a ﬁnite number of types. But the analysis
extends straightforwardly if A(.) instead describes a continuum of underlying abilities.9
Suppose then that A(.) is distributed according to a Gamma distribution:
A













where k0,k1 > 0 and Γ(.) is the gamma function. The mean and variance of A(.) are
µ = k0k1 and σ2 = (k0)2k1.10 We consider values of k0 and k1 such that the density A′
roughly resembles the shape of the distribution of ex-ante worker heterogeneity used in
Bontemps et. al. (1999) and estimated by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b). Figure 2
describes three ability distributions with the same mean but diﬀerent spreads: speciﬁcally
(a) k0 = 6, k1 = 3.3; (b) k0 = 4, k1 = 5 and (c) k0 = 2, k1 = 10. Figure 3 describes the
resulting equilibrium wage distributions.
It is immediately apparent that the overall shape of the wage density closely resembles
that of the density of initial productivities. This is perhaps not very surprising as wages
paid are directly linked to a worker’s productivity, and a worker’s productivity is directly
related to his/her initial productivity when ﬁrst entering the labour market. Nevertheless
we know by Figure 1 that there is signiﬁcant wage dispersion and non-trivial wage dy-
namics for each type. Table 2 below decomposes the wage variation described in Figure
3 into its underlying components:
var(logw) = var(logyi) + var(logθ) + ρ
2var(x) + 2ρcov(x,logθ).
To construct this table, we ﬁrst constructed the Market Equilibrium for each case and
then computed each of the above components. Their total sum is reported in the second
column, while their relative contribution to this sum is given in the subsequent columns.
Noting that logy = logyi+ρx, row (a) implies that 82% in the variation in log productivity
is due to disperse initial abilities, the remaining 18% arises as workers accumulate human
capital with experience, and worker experience is disperse in a steady state. The lower
9The only diﬀerence is that we instead integrate over dA rather than sum over i in the proﬁt function.
10The alternative speciﬁcations of A we used were Generalised Pareto, Three parameter Weibull and
Uniform. The insights described below are robust to these functional forms of A.




























Figure 2: Initial productivity densities























Figure 3: Wage density when A is continuous
rows (b)-(d) impose smaller variation in the distribution of initial abilities.11
11Since (13) and (9) are independent of workers initial abilities, the values of var(logθ), ρ2var(x)
and 2ρcov(x,θ) do not change across the cases studied. Namely, the above parameter values imply
var(logθ) = 0.0744, ρ2var(x) = 0.075 and 2ρcov(x,logθ) = 0.0936 for all rows (a)-(d) in Table 1. The
implied correlation between x and logθ is 0.63.
19Table 2: Variance Decomposition of Log Wages
Density of A Total variation Relative contribution (%)
var(logw) var(logyi) var(logθ) ρ2var(x) 2ρcov(x,logθ)
(a) 0.596 59.2 12.5 12.6 15.7
(b) 0.464 47.6 16.0 16.2 20.2
(c) 0.348 30.2 21.4 21.6 26.8
Degenerate 0.243 0 30.6 30.9 38.5
The most interesting feature of Table 2 is the ﬁnal column which describes the impact
of equilibrium sorting on wage dispersion. Note that if there were no learning-by-doing,
ρ = 0, then the ﬁnal two columns would both be zero. In these examples, equilibrium
sorting more than doubles the impact of learning-by-doing on wage dispersion/inequality.
Young unemployed workers not only have little experience, most job oﬀers typically pay
low wages. Over time young workers become better paid not only because they become
more experienced, and thus more productive, they also eventually ﬁnd and quit to bet-
ter paid employment. The positive correlation between these two processes signiﬁcantly
magniﬁes measured wage inequality: the young typically earn much less than the old.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have constructed and analyzed a labour market equilibrium in which there
is on-the-job search and workers accumulate general human capital through learning-
by-doing. The approach yields a new and insightful variance decomposition of wages.
Numerical simulations suggest that equilibrium sorting generates an important fraction
of wage inequality. New labour market entrants are inexperienced and their ﬁrst job is
likely to yield a low pay rate. Over time those workers not only gain experience and thus
become more productive, they also ﬁnd and quit to better paid employment. Eventually
(with luck) they become relatively well-paid employees. Topel and Ward (1992) explicitly
document such wage formation behavior for young male workers in the U.S. manufacturing
sector. Our numerical example suggests such sorting may more than double the impact
of learning-by-doing on measured wage inequality.
This approach seems a highly promising benchmark for future empirical work. It
yields (i) a Mincer wage equation, (ii) the ‘right’ time proﬁle of worker wage outcomes -
the initial 10 years of a worker’s career are characterised by several job changes and rapid
wage growth - and (iii) the implied cross section distribution of wages paid has the ‘right’
structure (the density of wages paid is single peaked with a ‘fat’ Pareto right tail). It also
provides a coherent link between the Mincer literature on the determination of wages and
income inequality in (dynamic) labour markets.
20There are several lines for further research. A simple extension is to allow diﬀerent
arrival rate of oﬀers for employed and unemployed workers. This changes the equation
for the reservation piece rate of unemployed workers θR but, given θR, this does not
otherwise aﬀect competition between ﬁrms for employed workers. We believe the insights
of the paper go through automatically.
A more diﬃcult challenge is to note that standard Mincer wage equations typically as-
sume decreasing returns to experience; i.e. the return to experience, ρ = ρ(x), is quadratic
rather than linear. For tractability the model here has assumed productivity grows with
experience at a constant rate. Without this assumption unemployed workers with dif-
ferent experiences would have diﬀerent returns to further experience. Intuition suggests
more experienced workers, having a lower return to further experience, would then have
higher reservation piece rates. Thus when laid-oﬀ, more experienced workers would have
longer (expected) spells of unemployment (which appears a reasonable prediction). Such
an extension would be valuable as it would yield a more ﬂexible Mincer wage equation
logwijt = logyi + logθj + ρ(xit).
Unfortunately disperse reservation piece rates severely complicates the aggregation prob-
lem and solving for the equilibrium distribution functions F,H becomes problematic.
Nevertheless these latter distribution functions might still be usefully estimated on data.
A diﬃcult but more tractable extension is to incorporate wage/tenure contracts into
the analysis. Burdett and Coles (2003) supposes all ﬁrms and workers are ex-ante iden-
tical but, in contrast to B/M, ﬁrms post contracts where wages paid depend on tenure.
It identiﬁes an equilibrium where ﬁrms oﬀer diﬀerent contracts, but each ﬁrm oﬀers a
contract where wages paid increase smoothly with tenure. In such a market environment,
workers are promoted by seniority: as more senior employees quit or retire, junior employ-
ees are promoted to take their place. By rewarding loyalty, this promotion mechanism
reduces the quit incentives of junior employees and so allows the ﬁrm to extract even
greater search rents (and so increase proﬁt). Learning-by-doing and a piece rate tenure
contract θ = θ(τ) would then yield a Mincer wage equation of the following form
logwijt = logyi + ρxit + logθj(τit),
where θj(.) is now the tenure contract oﬀered by ﬁrm j. Such an extension makes clear
the underlying identiﬁcation problem: the econometrician needs to disentangle the ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀect from ﬁrm speciﬁc tenure eﬀects. The objective for theory is to identify how
this might be done. The arguments developed here provide the necessary techniques for
attempting such an extension.
Finally one might incorporate ﬁrm heterogeneity into the model. With no on-the-job
learning and identical workers, Van den Berg and Ridder (1998) and Bontemps et. al.
21(1999) show that for a given distribution of ﬁrm productivities, the B/M framework yields
a unique equilibrium distribution of posted wages. By selecting an appropriate distribu-
tion of ﬁrm productivities it is possible to generate an equilibrium wage distribution that
has an interior mode and is skewed the right way. But as noted by Mortensen (2003) and
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006), it is diﬃcult to construct a distribution of ﬁrm produc-
tivities that approximates the empirical wage density - one needs to assume a distribution
of ﬁrm productivities that has an implausible long right tail. Although introducing ﬁrm
heterogeneity would seem useful for empirical work, it is not clear that it will yield new
and useful theoretical insights.
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24APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1:
Note that a worker’s income, whether unemployed or employed, is always proportional
to y. As on-the-job learning is also proportional to y and workers are risk neutral, (1)
and (2) imply there exists a number αU and a function αE(.) such that W U(y) = αUy
and W E(y,θ) = αE(θ)y. Since θR satisﬁes W E(y,θR) = W U(y) it is immediate that θR
is independent of y and common across all unemployed workers. (1) then implies αU
satisﬁes
φα




























and by evaluating (16) at θ = θ we obtain the boundary condition αE(θ) = (θ+δαU)/(δ+
φ − ρ).












Comparing this equation with (15) establishes (3) as described in Proposition 1. Next
integrate (15) by parts. Using (17) and αE(θR) = αU then yields (4) in Proposition 1.
Thus (3) and (4) describe a pair of equations for (αU,θR). Note that (3) is linear, has
slope −1/ρ and αU = 0 at θR = b. Diﬀerentiating (4) with respect to θR, on the other














The parameter restriction φ > ρ implies that the locus described in (4) is ﬂatter (strictly)
than the locus described in (3) for all θ, even when θR < θ. Moreover, as the former locus
implies αU is strictly positive and ﬁnite at θR = b, continuity now implies these two loci
must have a unique intersection at some θR < b.
Finally, solving for θR using (3) and (4) and then (implicitly) diﬀerentiating establishes
that θR is strictly decreasing in ρ. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Lemma 1:
25As the arguments are already well known (see B/M) we only sketch the proof. A
contradiction argument establishes there cannot be a mass point in F. If there were, say
at θ = θm, steady state would imply a mass of employees on piece rate θm. But oﬀering
piece rate θ = θm + ε where ε > 0 but very small would yield a slightly lower proﬁt per
hire but a large increase in the hiring rate, and this deviation would strictly increase proﬁt
(and so contradict equilibrium). A contradiction argument also establishes the support
of F must be connected. Otherwise if there were a hole, say for θ ∈ [θL,θH] then the
oﬀer θ = θL would yield strictly greater proﬁt (as both oﬀers attract the same number of
workers) which contradicts θH being an optimal oﬀer. Finally a contradiction argument
also establishes θ = θR. θ < θR would imply a ﬁrm oﬀering θ = θ obtains zero proﬁt, which
contradicts strictly positive proﬁt. θ > θR would instead imply oﬀering θ = θR makes
strictly greater proﬁt than oﬀering θ which contradicts optimality of θ. This completes
the proof of lemma 1.
Proof of Proposition 2:





φ(φ + δ + λ) + λδH(x,θ)
(φ + λ)
.
Integrating this linear diﬀerential equation, noting H(0,θ) = 0, ﬁnds




Using this in (6) and simplifying yields (8).













As H(0,θ) = 0, employed workers instantly accumulate positive experience, we obtain







for all x ≥ 0, θ ∈ [θ,θ]. Using (8) and integrating yields (9). This completes the proof of
Proposition 2.
Proof of Theorem 1 - Derivation of θR :













for any given F. Fix a θ and let F = b F(θ | θ), where b F(θ | θ) is described by (13).
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2ρ(φ + δ − ρ)(1 − θ)1/2
φ(φ + δ − ρ + λ)
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(1 − θ)




Noting that (13) implies
θ = 1 −
￿
φ + δ − ρ
φ + δ − ρ + λ
￿2
(1 − θ),
solving for b θR(θ) = θ then gives the expression in (14).
Derivation of the wage density:
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and x ≥ 0, otherwise, h(x,θ) = 0. As employed workers earning a wage













The wage density is then obtained by diﬀerentiating wrt w.
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